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Introduction
Many important economic decisions are made by teams rather than by individuals. Examples for these decisions include decisions about consumption and savings, virtually all signicant strategic decisions by corporations (Cooper and Kagel, 2005) , central bank decisions regarding monetary policy (Blinder, 2007) , or investment decisions by mutual funds (Prather and Middleton, 2002) . To capture all relevant aspects of decision situations like these, it is therefore important to see if groups behave dierently than individuals. Recently, group behavior has become the focus of many economic studies which can be divided into two main categories. The rst one looks at groups which have to come to a consensus decision and where no payo conict is present. Following , this approach is called team decision making. The second, more recent area of investigation examines whether group membership alone is sucient to cause a change in behavior.
The results of team decision making studies usually show that teams are closer to the standard game-theoretic predictions in the ultimatum game, thus choosing lower oers as proposers and accepting lower oers as responders (Bornstein and Yaniv, 1998) , and send and return smaller amounts in an investment game (Cox, 2002 and Kugler et al., 2007) . Furthermore, teams exit a centipede game earlier than individuals (Bornstein et al., 2004) and show higher levels of rationality in beauty contests, thus outperforming individuals (Kocher and Sutter, 2005) . While most of these studies show that groups are more rational and / or selsh, Cason and Mui (1997) nd that groups are more generous in the dictator game. 1 Similar results can be found in studies of non-strategic tasks. For example, a study on portfolio selection by Rockenbach et al. (2007) shows that teams are better at making the trade-o between risk and higher expected payo and a study by Charness et al. (2007a) demonstrates that teams are better than individuals at following the principles of Bayesian updating.
The second area of study looks at the eect of group membership alone. Here, one can dierentiate between naturally occurring groups and induced group membership. As an example, Bernhard et al. (2006) study dierent native social groups in Papua New Guinea using a dictator game with third-party punishment. They nd ingroup favoritism in sharing decisions and norm enforcement. From a study of dierent ethnic groups in Vietnamese village communities, Tanaka   1 Although a follow-up study by Luhan et al. (2009) arrives at the opposite result. 4 et al. (2006) suggest that the eect of group membership depends on the respective status of the groups concerned. Finally, Goette et al. (2006) look at dierent platoons in the Swiss army as groups and nd that cooperation in a prisoner's dilemma game increases with ingroup players. Studies with induced group membership allow more control by the experimenter, thus making it possible to vary the strength of the group membership. Eckel and Grossman (2005) use a public good game to this end and nd that just being identied with a team is, alone, insucient to overcome self-interest. However, strengthening group identication, for example through problem solving exercises, leads to higher contributions and less free-riding in the public good game. Similar results are found by Charness et al. (2007b) using prisoner's dilemma and battle-of-the-sexes games. When group membership is suciently salient, it signicantly alters individual behavior.
This study lies at the intersection of these two literature areas. While it uses communication and payo commonality as in team decision making studies, it isolates the group membership eect by introducing a hierarchical decision rule. This is innovative in two respects: rstly, the decision rule allows a clear comparison between decisions made by an individual as part of a group and acting alone. Secondly, the content of the communication is recorded, so that possible reasons for the eect of group membership can be analyzed. The paper mainly focuses on the dierence in the way subjects behave when they are part of a group compared to when they are acting alone. The main results of this paper are as follows: While introducing group membership through payo commonality makes subjects more selsh, the decision in a group with pre-play chat communication is not dierent from the individual decision. Furthermore, when communication in the group is allowed, a consensus decision is actively sought after, even though the decision rule does not need the agreement of all group members. The communication content shows that the group members are aware of the decision rule, but still seek to inuence the nal decision.
Experimental Design

Structure
To study the eect of group membership on behavior, a four-stage experiment with a withinsubject design is conducted. In each stage a modied dictator game (introduced by Andreoni and Miller, 2002) is used as the base game. Individual behavior in the modied dictator game has been analyzed by Bardsley (2008) and List (2007) , who both nd that modifying the game's structure, i.e. the addition of a taking option, inuences outcomes signicantly compared to the standard dictator game. The modied dictator game is used here as it allows a wider range of behavior for the subjects, making it easier to detect the possible eect of group membership.
At the end of the experiment, one stage is randomly chosen and payed out 2 . Upon arrival, subjects are randomly divided into Dictators and Receivers and retain these roles throughout the whole experiment. 3 See Appendix for a complete set of instructions. has to decide on the split and one of the decisions is randomly chosen afterwards to be the binding one for the group. This decision is then applied to all members of the particular group.
Dictators do not get any information on which decision was binding in the group. The matching of one Dictator to one Receiver is kept to avoid that Dictators change their behavior because they are now dealing with a group instead of dealing with an individual. Sutter et al. (2009) for example argue that when interacting with a group instead of an individual, an out-group scheme is recalled which renders the interaction competitive, deceitful and aggressive (see also Pemberton et al., 1996) .
In the third stage (Group Chat), the Dictators are again randomly divided into groups of three, where the subjects are labeled Number 1, Number 2 and Number 3. Each group can communicate internally via electronic chat for ve minutes. The chat is set up in a way that all group members can see all messages, it is not possible to write a message to a single group member. All messages stay visible during the ve minutes, so one group member can look back to the beginning of the chat and see what has been written. After the chat, the subject labeled Number 3 makes one decision which is binding for all group members, including himself. This decision rule is known to all group members before the chat. In addition, the group members labeled Number 1 and Number 2 are asked how they would have decided in the position of Number 3. An electronic chat is used as it is easy to record for subsequent analysis, retains a high level of anonymity (compared to face-to-face or audio chat), and is natural for participants.
The subjects were informed that they can communicate only just prior to the third stage, they
did not yet know about the future communication in the second stage. The experiment was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted at the Essen laboratory for experimental economics (elfe) in June 2010. Subjects were recruited by the online recruiting system ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) . After the experiment, payos were made separately. The participants were undergraduate students from the University of DuisburgEssen; their elds of study included business administration, economics, law, languages, and others. The experiment as a whole lasted about 60 minutes, including payo time. Average payo was EUR 12 with the highest payo being EUR 24 and the lowest one EUR 0. Four sessions with 24 participants each were conducted, leading to a total of 96 subjects.
3 Research questions and expectations
Theoretical Background
Standard economic theory focuses on individual-level incentives in decision making and thus has no place for group membership eects. If in addition the assumption of selshness holds, the Dictators should take all of the endowment in all four stages, leading to the following hypothesis:
Selsh: The Dictators will take all of the endowment in all 4 stages.
Of course, prior research using the modied dictator game (see Bardsley, 2008 and List, 2007) has shown that such purely selsh behavior is seldomly observed. Still, it is useful as a simple and clear baseline to measure behavior against. While social preferences introduced other people's payos into an individual utility function and therefore leave the selsh assumption, this is not aected by group membership either. So the existence of some kind of social preferences can be used to explain why Dictators do not take the maximum amount for themselves, but is not sucient to account for changes between the stages. If therefore group membership has no inuence on behavior, the following hypothesis can be formulated:
In contrast to standard economic theory, social psychology has a long tradition in analyzing group membership eects. The Group Polarization Hypothesis based on two underlying theories is a possible explanation for these eects. This hypothesis, rst presented by Moscovici and Zavalloni (1969) , states that the average postgroup response will tend to be more extreme in the same direction as the average of the pregroup responses. It is stated for cases in which communication among the group is allowed. This shift may have an informational or a normative explanation. The dominant informational explanation is the Persuasive Argument Theory, while the normative explanations stress the tendency of group members to compare themselves with others and the wish to be perceived positively and is formalized in the Social Comparison Theory (SCT). According to the Persuasive Argument Theory (PAT), people are inuenced by the number and persuasiveness of pro and contra arguments that they can recall from memory when making decisions. In a group, arguments are pooled, so the initial positions are enhanced by more arguments. This inuence consists of the observation that a discussion generates arguments which predominantly favor the initially preferred alternative. The Social Comparison Theory provides a second theoretical explanation for the Group Polarization phenomenon. It states that people are motivated both to perceive and to present themselves in a socially desirable way. Furthermore, people tend to perceive themselves as more favorable than what they believe to be the average tendency. According to the Group Polarization Hypothesis, group discussion moves the decision into the direction of initial tendency. This means that the group's leader is inuenced by the other group members' preferences which they can communicate during the chat. The amount of money divided is held constant on an individual level, so there is no incentive to change behavior. In addition, no consensus decision in the group is needed, as one group member is randomly picked to make the binding decision. Thus, no compromise is necessary and every Dictator can decide purely according to her preferences. This ensures that the group membership is the only variable which changed. Following this, the third hypothesis is dened as follows:
GroupChatA: The group leaders' decisions will change between the stages Individual I and Group Chat in the direction of the median decisions of all group members.
The same should happen to the hypothetical oers by the group members who do not have the leader role and whose oers are therefore not payo-relevant. These hypothetical decision may be even more inuenced by the wish to appear socially desirable, because this does not incur any costs for the group members: As their decisions do not have payo consequences, they do not have to suer the utility loss associated with receiving less money. They can conform to the social norm without costs to themselves. From this reasoning, another hypothesis can be derived regarding the behavior after the pre-play communication:
GroupChatB: The group members' hypothetical decisions will change between the stages Individual I and Group Chat in the direction of the median decisions of all group members. This dierence will be more pronounced than the one for the group leaders.
In stage Individual II, the subjects decide individually again. Looking at the behavior in this stage, it is necessary to distinguish between the two possible underlying causes of the Group Polarization Hypothesis. If one follows the Social Comparison Theory, a possible change in behavior is only due to the desire to be perceived in a certain way by the group members. In stage Individual II of the experiment, this is no longer the case and the leader's oer should fall back to the initial oer he made in stage Individual I :
SCT: The Dictators' decisions will not change between the stages Individual I and Individual
II.
However, if the Persuasive Argument Theory is the cause of the polarization, the arguments presented by the other group members have inuenced the leader. Assuming that the subjects can still recall the arguments from stage Group Chat, the change in behavior should be permanent, meaning that there will be a change in the decisions made between the two individual stages.
Additionally, as the group members have been inuenced by the very same arguments, the nal hypothesis regarding Dictator behavior is dened as follows:
PAT: The Dictators' decisions change from stage Individual I to Individual II in the direction of the group decision.
The eect of group membership on social preferences which incorporate other people's payos 10 into a utility function has been analyzed by Chen and Li (2009) using several games 5 . In short, all of their results are compatible with the hypothesis that participants are more altruistic towards an ingroup match. The analysis presented here uses a similar theoretical framework of group membership or group identity, but diers with regard to the treatment: The counterpart of the subject whose behavior is analyzed is kept constant, i.e., the Dictators always interact with one Receiver who is not part of a group. Instead, group membership is introduced as the treatment variable.
Results
Group Membership
In stage Individual I, sub jects decide individually without any induced group membership. The average amount taken by the Dictators is EUR 2.67 (median EUR 1).
The decisions range from taking EUR 12 (thus taking away all of the Receiver's endowment), to giving EUR 2 to the Receiver with an overall standard deviation of the Dictators' payo of 4.12. Clearly, the behavior formulated in hypothesis selsh can be rejected 6 . In all four stages, Dictators share the endowments to some degree. This behavior is in line with existing Dictator Game studies and can be explained with a heterogeneous population of agents, where some individuals have some kind of other-regarding preferences while others follow the classical, perfectly selsh payo maximization 7 .
In stage Group, Dictators keep on average EUR 15.6 (median EUR 14) for themselves (see Figure 2) . They, thus, take away roughly one Euro more from the Receivers when they act for the group than when they act alone. This change in behavior implies that hypothesis Group can be rejected at the 10% level (p = 0.075 using a two-sided Wilcoxon Signed Rank test). Being part of a group already changes subjects' behavior towards being more selsh and less other-regarding.
A closer look at the data reveals that 47.9% of the Dictators did not change their behavior when Chat as stage Individual I, while 25% took more away and 31% took less away. This balanced behavior explains the result that no dierence in the aggregate behavior between these two stages is observed. The distribution of Dictator decisions now moves away from the selsh distributions towards the equal split, with more than 55% of groups choosing this outcome (see Figure 4) . own group or the arguments presented during the discussion serves as a motivation for some of the leaders to change their decision. However, this is unlikely as the majority of the group leaders do not change their decisions from stage Individual I to stage Group Chat. Of these, 71% encountered a group median dierent from their own preference. Consequently, they choose to stick to their original decision in spite of being confronted with arguments for other decisions and a social comparison which deviated from their own decision. Only two group leaders became more other-regarding despite their group members displaying preferences for more selshness, while a more selsh group median always leads to more selsh decision of the leader. This indicates that following the group's social norm is easier for the leaders when this means a higher own payo. This is reminiscent of the idea in social preferences where an upward deviation in payo gives less disutility than a downward deviation (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) . Chat, where communication was allowed. This points to a lasting eect of the group membership and the group discussion which took place in the preceding stages. One possible explanation is that while group membership per se drives decisions in a more rational and selsh direction, the communication aspect of group membership highlights arguments which are concerned with a socially accepted decision, thus making group members on average more other-regarding. As soon as the communication is not possible anymore, subjects then fall back to their new, more selsh behavior. This becomes also clear when looking at the distribution of divisions from stage Group Chat and stage Indvidual II ( Figure 5 ). The clear peak at the equal split from stage Group Chat gets smaller and the decisions move back towards the more selsh divisions. Looking at hypothesis SCT and PAT from the group members' perspective, the group members took away EUR 3.3 on average in stage Indvidual I (median EUR 1) while in stage Indvidual II they took away EUR 4.9 on average (median EUR 4.5) from their assigned Receivers. Although both decisions were made individually, this dierence is weakly signicant (p=0.077) using a two-sided Wilcoxon Signed Rank test. So while they did indeed change their behavior, they did not change it in the direction of the group decision, thus again both hypotheses SCT and PAT can be rejected. Figure   7 shows a classication of agents into a selsh type (all agents taking away at least EUR 3 from their assigned Receiver) and an equal type (all agents taking away a maximum of EUR 2). There is no signicant dierence regarding the the type distribution (using a McNemar test) between the rst two stages or between stages Group and Group Chat. However, splitting the sample between the group leaders and the group members reveals a divergence in the type classication. The subjects who actually had to make the binding decisions can be classied as 68.8% equal type and 31.3% selsh type, while among those subjects who only made a hypothetical decision this division is only 46.9% equal type and 53.1% selsh type. This can be interpreted in a way that the group members are aware that their decision will not inuence the Receivers and thus allows them to decide only according to the payo of themselves and their group members.
Chat Analysis
Looking at the chat content illuminates how the decision process in the group developed. Quantitatively, the average ve-minute chat included 1035 characters or 36.3 messages. The minimum of messages exchanged during a group discussion was 15, while at most 65 messages were sent during the allotted ve minutes. On average, 35% of the chat was contributed by the leader, 38% by the member designated Number 1 and 26 % by the group member designated Number 2 when measured by the number of characters. This distribution is not signicantly dierent from an equal distribution using a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. As the decision rule was clear for all participants and the decision situation was well known to the participants, such extensive communication was not neccessary. Still, both leaders and members used up most of the given time. For the two group members, this suggests that they anticipated that the leader may be inuenced by their preferences or arguments.
Looking at the content of the chat messages, six topics can be identied that are discussed most often: fairness, own payo, voting / compromise, decision rule, morality and the question of earning or deserving the payo. Table 1 gives an overview how many groups and subjects have discussed these topics and how many messages are sent containing one or more these topics, it furthermore includes a typical example for each topic. talk for the leader making the nal decision. Still, in most of the groups the members try to reach a consensus and talk about a possible vote or compromise. If a consensus is actually reached during the discussion, the leader always adheres to this, even if this means deviating from her decision in the previous rounds. The fact that no group leader deviated from the intention they stated during the chat might be explained with a general aversion to lying, see for example Fischbacher and Heusi (2008) or Mazar and Ariely (2006) . It is interesting to note that in all but two groups it is the leader who is actively asking for the group members' preferences.
However, a clear inuence of the discussed topics on the nal decision can not be found 9 .
Conclusion
When determining the inuence of group membership on individual behavior, it is necessary to dene what exactly group membership entails. This study shows that group membership induced by payo commonality leads to more selsh behavior if not accompanied by communication.
However, when communication among the group is added, the eect disappears and subjects Here, the leader's payo and that of the members is always equal per the hierarchical decision rule. Therefore, the leader asking for the group members' preferences shows that he is aware that they may have dierent utilities associated with dierent payos. The leader not only cares for the payo the other group members receive, but for the utility they derive from this payo.
9
Using a regression with dummy variables for the dierent categories as explaining variables, and the leader's decision as dependent variable.
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